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COMPETITIVENESS IN STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS, 19462009
Herbert M. Kritzer*
There has been much debate over changes in state supreme court elections. However,
most of the research that debate refers to considers a relatively short time span. This
article reports an analysis of contestation and competitiveness in state supreme elections
for the entire post-World War II period. The paper considers both primary and general
elections (other than retention elections). The central finding of the paper is that outside
the South there has been surprisingly little change, either in whether incumbents are
challenged for reelection or in the competitiveness of the elections that are contested
(looking separately at open seat elections and elections involving incumbents). The
analysis suggests that the apparent increase in competiveness (taken to include the
question of whether or not an incumbent is challenged), at least through 2009, reflects
factors other than changes in the nature of campaigns and expenditures on state supreme
court elections; specifically, those changes largely result from the end of the one-party
South

I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, I examine one dimension of change in state supreme court elections:
competitiveness. Specifically, has the likelihood increased that elections for seats on the various
___________________
* Address correspondence to Herbert M. Kritzer, University of Minnesota Law School, 229 19th Avenue South,
Minneapolis, MN 55455; email: kritzer@umn.edu. kritzer is the Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Public Policy
and Affiliated Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.
Assembling the data for the analysis presented in this paper proved to be a significant undertaking. While for
many states the information is readily available online or in published form (e.g., in state “blue books,” “legislative
manuals,” and the like), for others the information is to be found only available in archives or in local newspapers
which could be obtained only on microfilm via interlibrary loan. I received tremendous assistance in this endeavor
from reference librarians and interlibrary loan staff at the University of Wisconsin Law Library, the William
Mitchell College of Law Library, and the University of Minnesota Law Library. A number of individuals in state
election offices were extremely helpful and responsive, as were a number of scholars who provided me with data
from their states and/or answered questions about possible sources for their states. I would particularly like to thank
Jess Clayton who worked as a project assistant for me at the University of Wisconsin. Melinda Gann Hall
generously provided me with tabulations she had done based on data compiled by the Brennan Center; Adam
Skaggs at the Brennan Center provided with a prelease copy of the Center’s 2010 report and spreadsheets with data
on advertising in 2006 and 2008. Reviewers for the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies provided several valuable
suggestions. Finally, I acknowledge support I received from the University of Wisconsin Graduate School and the
University of Wisconsin Political Science Department.
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courts will be contested and, for those that are contested, are the elections more likely to be
competitive? The issue is relevant for the recurring debate over judicial selection in the states, a
debate that is likely to increase in intensity in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. ___ (2010), a decision which has the
potential to produce a flood of corporate expenditures in judicial, as well as other, elections.
There is no doubt that state supreme court elections have changed in some ways. Thanks to
reports produced by New York University Law School’s Brennan Center (Goldberg, Holman,
and Sanchez 2000; Goldberg, Samis, Bender, and Weiss 2004; Goldberg and Sanchez 2004;
Sample, Jones, and Weiss 2007) (Sample, Skaggs, Blitzer, and Casey 2010, 8), we know that
spending and advertising in such elections have increased in the aggregate, with candidate
fundraising in the decade 2000-2009 more than doubling from $83.3 million in the prior decade
to $206.4 million (Sample, Skaggs, Blitzer, and Casey 2010, 8). However, despite fears
expressed in the wake of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), which
struck down key limitations on what candidates for judicial office could say in the course of their
campaigns (i.e., bans on announcing positions on legal or political issues), there is no evidence
that the tone of advertising in state supreme court elections has undergone broad change. The
proportion of elections that feature attack-style ads has remained stable since 2002. 1 The
proportion of advertising airings comprised of attack ads, has varied since 2000 but shows no
particular pattern; it proportion was actually highest in 2000. 2

1

Using data on campaign advertising assembled by the Brennan Center for 2002 through 2006, Melinda Gann Hall
(2011) found that the proportion of elections featuring attack ads had been fairly stable over the period: 11.1%,
16.3%, and 10.6%; for 2008 the corresponding figure is 11.6%.
2
Based on information appearing in Brennan Center reports or provided to me by staff at the Brennan Center, the
percentage of airings that were attack ads for 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006: 38.4%, 7.5% or 9.9%, 22.5%, 20.0%, and
26.1%; the ambiguity for 2002 reflects that the Brennan Center report shows a percentage as well as providing the
data themselves, and my calculation from the data (7.5%) differs from the summary figure in the report (9.9%).
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More relevant for the analysis presented in this article is the role of competitiveness and
contestation in such elections, and whether competition is a positive or a negative. Democratic
theory would lead one to see competitive elections as a good thing because it would be indicative
of an active public debate and this is just as true for judicial elections as for elections to other
types of public office (see Bonneau and Hall 2009). Ironically, for many observers increased
competition in judicial elections is seen as a negative because it leads candidates to do things
(raise money, state positions on issues, attack opponents) that are taken to be incompatible with
the judicial role. Thus, for proponents of reform, such as retired U.S. Supreme Court justice
Sandra Day O’Connor who chairs the O’Connor Judicial Selection Initiative (see Schwartz
2009), increasing levels of competition in elections for judges would be a primary reason to
move to alternative systems of judicial selection. 3
In fact, the evidence regarding increased competition in recent years is mixed. Melinda
Gann Hall has examined the question of whether state supreme court incumbents were
challenged in elections (both partisan and nonpartisan) over the period 1980 to 2000, and found
that the percent challenged grew from about 50 percent at the beginning of the period she
examined to 75 percent or more at the end of the period (Hall 2007, 171). 4 However, her analysis
did not reveal any clear trends in the competitiveness of elections where challengers entered the
race or in patterns competition in open seat elections (id., 175-82). 5

3

It is worth noting that while the debate is expressed in terms of “judicial elections” generally, the concern has been
primarily with state supreme court elections. In fact the vast majority of research on judicial elections focuses on
state supreme courts we know much less about elections to lower courts, either in terms of how those elections are
conducted (but see Arbour and McKenzie 2010) or about the impact of the selection process on what lower court
judges actually do when on the bench (but see Huber and Gordon 2004; Kritzer 2007, 462-64).
4
Hall also examines retention elections for state supreme court justice, which I omit from my analysis. Aspin (2007)
has tracked retention elections, covering both state supreme courts and lower courts, for a set of states back to 1964.
5
In an earlier article, which examined elections between 1980 and 1994, Hall showed that competitiveness in state
supreme court elections was actually fairly similar to the competitiveness in elections for the U.S. House of
Representatives (Hall 2001, 319)
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One possible concern regarding Hall’s analysis is the relatively short period, 20 years, she
examined. It is possible that the starting point for her research, 1980, represented not the end of a
period of stability vis-à-vis challenges to incumbents but either just one point on a longer trend
of secular change or a low point in what could be a something of a cyclical pattern. Similarly, it
might be that examining a longer period would show changes in the competitiveness of elections
that occurred prior to 1980. 6
In this article I present an analysis of the pattern of competition, both contestation and
closeness, in judicial elections over a 64 year period, 1946 through 2009. I focus specifically on
seats up for election. In the discussion that follows I examine whether the elections for those
seats were contested and how close the elections were. Through this analysis, I seek to answer
the closely related questions of whether elections are more likely to be contested in recent years
and whether elections are more likely to be competitive.

II. DATA
For this study I sought to assemble data on every state supreme court election conducted on a
partisan or nonpartisan basis since 1946, including primary elections, primary run-offs, and
general elections; 7 these elections filled a total of 1,863 seats on state supreme courts. 8 The
sources for these data varied from state to state. For recent elections, virtually all of the needed
information was available online from state election office websites. For earlier elections, some
states routinely published detailed election reports which I was able to obtain from one of several

6

Dubois (1980, 50) provides some data on competitiveness of state supreme court elections for the period 19481974. However, his analysis excludes southern states and primary elections. Moreover, it does not control for the
presence of an incumbent in the election.
7
Texas and Oklahoma have separate courts of last resort for criminal and noncriminal cases; for those states, I have
included elections for both courts.
8
If three seats are up for election, for purposes of this paper I count that as three elections.
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libraries. For other states the necessary information was provided to me by state election offices.
For still other states, the information had been shipped off to state archives, and to obtain the
information I sought, it was necessary to arrange to have someone go to the archive and retrieve
the information on my behalf. For a few primary elections, I relied upon newspaper reports of
overall election results. 9
For those seats with contested primaries but an uncontested general election, I employ
information from the primary election. If there are both primary and general elections for a seat, I
use as my indicator of closeness the election with the closest vote involving the incumbent (or
the victor in the case of an open seat election). 10 States with multi-seat elections in which
candidates did not run for specific seats (i.e., if two seats were contested, the top two vote getters
win), what I will label “unassigned multi-seat elections”, raise some specific issues. First, how
should one handle the situation where the number of candidates is less than twice the number of
seats (i.e., three candidates running for two seats)? In those elections, if there is one fewer
candidates than twice the seats, I treat the top vote getter as unopposed; so, for example if there
are three seats and five candidates, one seat is deemed unopposed and two as opposed (with the
top vote getter assigned to the unopposed seat). The second issue is how to determine how close
the elections are in unassigned, multi-seat elections? I adopt the convention of pairing first the
highest and lowest vote getters, then the second highest and second lowest, on down. For

9

The newspaper reports were usually unofficial and often provided less than complete results. However, given the
way I have categorized election results, it is unlikely that complete returns would shift an election from one category
to another.
10
In a handful of elections, the incumbent was defeated in the primary election, and the winner of the primary went
on to face opposition in the general election. In those cases, I employed the results of the primary election in my
analysis. In partisan election states where the nonincumbent loser in the general election had run in a contested
primary election, I ignore the primary results involving the general election loser even if it was closer than the
general election.
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unassigned multi-seat partisan elections, I pair the highest Democrat with the lowest Republican,
the highest Republican with the lowest Democrat, and then the middle pair or pairs. 11
One final issue needs to be noted. Some competition is best described as symbolic rather
than real. For example, while through the 1940s, 50s, and into the 60s, elections in most of the
South were one-party affairs, there were a small number of state supreme court elections in
which Republicans did appear on the ballot. To say that such candidates did not stand a chance
of winning is an understatement: usually they received less than 15 percent of the vote. More
recently, some of the southern states have become essentially one-party Republican in state
supreme court elections, but in a number of elections uncontested by Democrats, Libertarians
have entered the general election to challenge the Republican candidate; typically the
Libertarians get at most 25 percent of the vote. Because of this phenomenon, 12 I have chosen not
to focus simply on contested versus uncontested elections, but rather to classify elections into
five categories: uncontested, symbolically contested (winner got 75-99% of the vote),
noncompetitive (winner got 60-74%), competitive (50-59% for the winner), 13 and incumbent
defeats; 14 the latter category applies only when there was an incumbent running for reelection. 15

11

Undoubtedly there are other ways that this could be handled. However, given that relatively few states have
unassigned, multi-seat elections, it is exceedingly unlikely that adopting a different approach would have a
significant impact on the results that I report in this article.
12
In a number of the elections involving what I label “symbolically contested” general elections there was a much
closer primary election, and that primary election is used for the statistical analysis.
13
I include in this category elections where the ultimate winner was not the top vote-getter in a first round (usually a
primary) but did win the run-off. Some readers might question my categorization, and prefer to limit “competitive”
elections to those in which the winner received 55 percent or less of the vote. I have repeated the analysis using the
categorization; the broad patterns that I report remain the same.
14
In computing the percentage, I focus on the top two vote-getters; for example, if there were three candidates in a
primary, getting 45%, 40%, and 15% respectively, I take the top two and recomputed the percentage focused on
those top candidates. In this case, that percentage would be 45/85 = 52.9%. My rationale for this approach is that it
is the closeness between the top two candidates that matters to the winner.
15
One other minor issue concerns retention elections. In this article I am not examining retention elections. There
are two states (Utah and Montana) that have a system of nonpartisan elections with the provision that if an
incumbent is not opposed, the election becomes a retention vote. I have treated such elections as unopposed
nonpartisan elections.
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III. ANALYSIS
The analysis that follows is presented mostly in the form of area graphs, all but one of which
divide the vertical space proportionately among the three to five categories being considered.
One can think of each graph as representing a series of pie charts or as a stacked bar vertical bar
graph that has been run together and smoothed. The advantage of these graphs is that it allows
one to quickly see how the distribution among the categories has shifted over time. The
disadvantage is that it takes a bit of effort to estimate a specific percentage other than for the
category shown at the bottom of the graph. In all of the area graphs (except Figure 2), the topmost area (always in light gray) represents the proportion of elections that were uncontested. The
solid black area just below the top area represents the proportion of elections that were
symbolically contested (the winner received at least 75 percent of the vote). The middle area
(shown in white) represents the proportion of noncompetitive elections in which the winner
received 60-74 percent. For elections involving incumbents, the dark gray area at the bottom of
the graph represents the proportion of elections in which the incumbent lost and the medium gray
area just above represents the proportion of elections that the incumbent won with less than 60
percent of the vote. For open-seat elections, the bottom area is shown in medium gray and
represents the proportion of elections won with less than 60 percent of the vote. 16
Most state supreme court elections take place in even-numbered years. In a small number of
states some or all such elections are held in odd-numbered years. For purposes of analysis and
presentation, I have grouped elections occurring in odd-numbered years with the prior year. For
open-seat elections, I have grouped the elections into four year sets, labeled with the year of the

16

In computing all of these percentages, I focus only on the top two vote-getters.
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FIGURE 1: CONTESTATION AND COMPETITIVENESS, ALL ELECTIONS
INVOLVING INCUMBENTS

presidential election; hence, the data point for open seat elections labeled 1948 captures the
judicial elections that occurred from 1946 through 1949.
A. Elections Involving Incumbents
Figure 1 shows the overall pattern of contestation and competitiveness in state supreme court
elections involving incumbents since 1946. To avoid clutter, Figure 1 and subsequent figures do
not show the number of elections upon which the percentages reflected in the figures are based; I
include this information in Appendix A (Table A1). For some of the figures the number of
elections reflected in a data point is quite small, and those figures need to be treated with caution.
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One can read Figure 1 by looking at a particular year and estimating the percentage for that year.
For example, for 1990 the figure shows that in 17
• 7% of the elections incumbents lost (dark gray area)
• 26% of the election incumbents won with less than 60% of the vote (medium gray
area)
• 15% of the elections incumbents won with 60-74% of the vote (white area)
• 2% of the elections incumbents won with 75% or more of the vote (black area)
• 40% of the elections incumbents were unopposed (light gray area)
As the figure shows, there is a lot of year-to-year variation; my interest is in patterns of change
of a period of years.
A first point to note is that while Figure 1 shows some are shifts, they are generally
relatively subtle as opposed to striking. There is no clear pattern in the likelihood of incumbents
being defeated (the bottom-most area shown in dark gray), although arguably there is a slight
increase starting around 1988. If one combines elections where incumbents lost with those which
I have labeled as competitive (i.e., combine the bottom two areas shown in medium and dark
gray), there does appear to be some pattern of increase starting in the 1970s. And while the graph
shows a decrease in the proportion of incumbents who were unchallenged (the top-most area in
the figure shown in light gray), one also sees that there was a period when the likelihood of being
unchallenged actually increased, and while percent unchallenged in the current period is lower
than earlier periods, how much lower depends on what one chooses to use as a baseline.
One obvious question is whether the pattern of change is random or reflects systematic
differences. To assess this, question, I compared the eight years starting in 1946 (the “early
period”, n=293) with the eight years ending in 2009 (the “late period”, n=185), and I collapsed
the first two categories (elections where the incumbent lost and elections where the incumbent

17

A spreadsheet showing the detail for each of the figures is available at
https://netfiles.umn.edu/users/kritzer/www/research/JELS2010-JudicialElectionFigures.xlsx.
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received less than 60 percent of the vote) and the last two categories (where the incumbent was
unopposed or won with 75 percent or more of the vote. 18 A simple goodness-of-fit (GOF) chi
square test for all elections involving incumbents shows that the difference between the early and
late periods is not statistically significant (• 2=3.34, df = 2, p=.188). One issue with the use of the
simple chi square test is that it assumes that all observations are statistically independent,
something with is clearly untrue given that there are multiple elections from a given state.
However, the impact of this kind of nonindependence tends to inflate the statistical significance
of the tests because the practical effect of such dependence is that one has less information than
the test assumes. Hence, when the chi square fails to achieve statistical significance, one can be
confident that an adjustment of the clustering of observations within states would not change the
conclusion from nonsignificance to statistically significant. 19
What about the dip in the middle of the period? To assess whether this introduces a
statistically significant difference, I created a ten-year “middle” period covering 1966 through
1975; the GOF chi square test using three periods is statistically significant (• 2=35.48, df = 4,
p<.001). In order to adjust for the nonindependence problem discussed in the previous paragraph,
I used Stata to fit a simple multinomial logistic regression model with dummy variables for the
late and middle periods (the early period served as the reference category) obtaining robust
standard errors with clustering on state, and did a general linear hypothesis test of the four
parameters. The resulting Wald-test chi square is 25.86 (4 df, p<.001), confirming that the dip in

18

I also ran the chi square tests without collapsing the five categories, and the results did not change, although the
number of observations in the “incumbent defeated” and “75-99% categories was very small for some of the later
figures discussed in the following pages. Generally, where the cell frequencies are low, I also ran Fisher’s Exact test;
the significance levels were virtually identical to what I found for the GOF chi square test, and hence I do not report
the significance levels for Fisher’s Exact.
19
I in fact ran the tests that adjusted for nonindependence for all of the tests reported as nonsignificant and the
adjusted tests were also nonsignificant.
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FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTION TYPES
(a)

(b)
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competition during the period 1966-75 reflected a statistically significant difference from the
early and late period.
While the middle period does involve a period of lowered competition, exactly what
accounts for that shift is unclear. One problem with interpreting this overall pattern is that over
the 64 year period shown in Figure 1, there have been major changes in the distribution of types
of elections. While in the 1940s the majority of elections were (at least nominally) partisan, by
the 2000s a majority were nonpartisan. Also, as shown in Figure 2a, there has been a substantial
decline in the number of elections, although this is largely due to a decline in the number of
partisan elections (the bottom area shown in light gray in the figure); the number of nonpartisan
elections (the top area show in dark gray in the figure) has remained relatively stable). 20 Figure
2a shows a small group of elections designated as “mixed” (the middle area shown in medium
gray); these are elections in Ohio, Michigan, and Arizona where nominations are (or were—
Arizona switched to the “merit” system in 1974) made by parties, through primaries in Ohio and
Arizona, and at conventions in Michigan. However, while the parties do the nominating, the
general election ballot does not show the party affiliation of the candidates. Because of the
shifting distribution of election types as shown in Figure 2b (a decreasing proportion are partisan
and an increasing proportion are nonpartisan), it is paramount to look separately at partisan and
nonpartisan elections to begin to understand the nature of changes competition and
competitiveness that may have occurred. Figure 2b also shows a line tracing the percentage of
state supreme court seats without an incumbent running; there appears to be a slight increase

20

This stability does mask some changes. A number of states that employed nonpartisan elections in 1946 have
since switched to “merit” systems for selecting and retaining members of the state supreme court. At the same time,
about the same number of states that previously used partisan elections have switched to nonpartisan elections (some
formerly partisan election states now use the “merit” system). Figure B1 in Appendix B shows the evolution of
selection systems among those states that used partisan, mixed, or nonpartisan elections in 1946.
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FIGURE 3: CONTESTATION AND COMPETITIVENESS, NONPARTISAN
ELECTIONS INVOLVING INCUMBENTS

over time, with under 20 percent (18.2) up through 1970, rising to about 25 percent (25.4) after
1970.
Figure 3 replicates Figure 1 but for nonpartisan elections only, not including the mixed
elections (which group more appropriately with partisan elections given the active and explicit
role of parties in the process). Figure 3 shows some decline in the percentage of nonpartisan
elections involving an unchallenged incumbent (the top most area in the graph). However, the
decline in unchallenged incumbents is not accompanied by an increase in competitive elections
(or incumbent losses); the increase comes in the noncompetitive elections. The difference
between the early and late periods does achieve statistical significance (GOF • 2=8.48, p=.014;
Wald • 2= 7.27, p=.026), although the pattern is not particularly strong.
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FIGURE 4: CONTESTATION AND COMPETITIVENESS, PARTISAN AND
MIXED ELECTIONS INVOLVING INCUMBENTS

Figure 4 provides the same information for partisan and mixed elections. Here one sees
initially an increase in unchallenged incumbents (the top, light gray area in the figure) into the
1970s followed by a sharp decline with a concomitant increase in competitive elections and
incumbent losses (the bottom two areas in dark and medium gray), although competitiveness
seems to have declined in the most recent years. Simple GOF chi square tests, either comparing
just early and late periods, or including the middle period 1966-75, 21 achieve statistical
significance (• 2=11.02, p=.004, comparing early and late; • 2=41.86, p<.001, comparing three
periods), and the Wald test using multinomial logistic regression with clustering is statistically
significant for the three period model (• 2=25.12, p<.001), but does not quite achieve statistical
21

If one were designating a middle period based purely on Figure 4, one would probably extend it back to start in
1964, and possibly extend it forward to 1979.

-14-

significance for the two period model (• 2=5.58, p<.061). This suggests that understanding the
decline in the middle period is important.
Initially, this pattern may seem surprising given that one might expect parties to make an
effort to find and support candidates. However, one must keep in mind that a substantial number
of the partisan elections are from states in the formerly one-party South and there have been huge
political changes in that region over the period under consideration. The change in the South
suggests looking separately at southern and nonsouthern states that use partisan (and mixed)
elections.
Figure 5 shows the pattern separately by region with the South defined as Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. 22 For
the South (Figure 5a) there are very substantial changes, both in the decline of unchallenged
incumbents (the top area) and in the increase in competitive elections and incumbent losses (the
bottom two areas). In the most recent years, there is an increase in symbolic challengers (shown
in black just below the top area in light gray that represents the proportion of elections involving
unchallenged incumbents). 23 All of the statistical tests of differences, both the two and three
period tests, and the GOF and Wald tests are strongly significant. 24 In contrast, in the Nonsouth,
there was a decrease in unchallenged incumbent elections (the top most area) but it occurred
prior to 1980; the pattern of competitive elections and incumbent losses shows no pattern of
22

For purposes of these figures, I have grouped the border states of Kentucky and Oklahoma with the Nonsouth
states; grouping Kentucky (which switched to nonpartisan elections in 1976) and Oklahoma (which switched to the
“merit” system starting in 1968) with the southern states makes little or no difference. Virginia and South Carolina
are no listed above because they do not use partisan or nonpartisan elections for selecting justices for their supreme
courts.
23
In assessing change in the South one also has to keep in mind that in the most recent years only Alabama,
Louisiana, and Texas retain the partisan election system. Tennessee and Florida have shifted to “merit” systems (in
1994 and 1978 respectively; Florida used nonpartisan elections from 1972 to 1976), and Arkansas (2002), Georgia
(1983), Mississippi (1996), and North Carolina (2004) all switched to nonpartisan elections. However, if I drop
from Figure 5a the states that abandoned partisan elections prior to 2000 (Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and
Tennessee), the pattern remains unchanged.
24
The two and three period GOF chi squares are 35.76 and 76.75 respectively; the corresponding Wald chi squares
from multinomial logistics regressions with clustering by state are 16.63 and 40.78 (for all four p<.001).
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FIGURE 5: CONTESTATION AND COMPETITIVENESS, PARTISAN ELECTIONS
INVOLVING INCUMBENTS BY REGION
(a) SOUTHERN STATES (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, TN, TX)

(b) NONSOUTH STATES
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change during the period under consideration. Neither the two period nor the three period GOF
chi squares approach statistical significance (• 2=0.61, p=.738; • 2=5.40, p=.248). 25
How might one account for the pattern in the South? The initial decline in competition may
have been in response to the perceived threat to the southern “way of life” created by legal
challenges to segregation that started in the 1950s and peaked in the 1960s. Then, with the
increase in competition coming as the South transitioned to a two party system (see Black 2004,
1002-07) elections to the state supreme courts started to become competitive. The marginal
decline in the most recent years may be due to the overwhelming dominance of the Republican
Party in many southern states. This is of course speculative, but it is consistent with the timing of
both the drop in competition around the 1964 election between Lyndon Johnson and Barry
Goldwater (and which came soon after the passage of the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act) in
which southern states felt particularly challenged vis-à-vis maintaining segregation, and with the
growth in competition starting around 1980 as the Republican party began to gain substantial
strength state-level contests in the southern states with the election of Ronald Reagan.
To summarize the pattern of change for elections involving incumbents, the major change is
concentrated in southern states with partisan elections. In nonpartisan elections and in partisan
(and mixed) elections outside the South there have been at most relatively modest shifts, largely

25

Two questions that might be raised about the pattern in Figure 5a are (1) whether it is driven by changes in which
states in the South employed partisan elections, and (2) whether it was driven by one or two states. As for the first
question, all of the states were present for the first two periods, and hence the drop during the middle period does not
reflect a change in the states represented in Figure 5a. Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Tennessee
abandoned partisan elections before the start of the late period; however, restricting the analysis to the remaining
states (Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas) produces the same pattern, and the pattern shows
statistically significant shifts over time (GOF • 2=49.77, p<.001). As for the second question, in the late period,
Texas provides almost 26 of the 38 elections, so an obvious question is whether Texas is driving the results.
Separate tabulations for Texas and for the other states as a group (Alabama, Louisiana, and North Carolina) show
that the pattern holds for both Texas and the other states, and that the pattern of change is statistically significant for
both (GOF • 2=29.06, p<.001 for Texas and GOF • 2=27.50, p<.001 for the other three states). Note that the sample
sizes here were too small to apply the multinomial logit analysis.

-17-

a decline in the number of uncontested elections. However, that decline has not translated into an
increase in competitive elections.

B. Open Seat Elections
As shown in Figure 2b, in most years well under 30 percent of seats up for election did not have
an incumbent seeking to retain his or her position; consequently there are many fewer open seat
elections for state supreme courts than there are elections involving incumbents. In part this is
the normal pattern of incumbents seeking reelection, but it also reflects the fact that in many
states that ostensibly elect the members of the state supreme court, midterm vacancies are filled
through an appointment process. Cutting the other way are three states (Illinois, New Mexico,
and Pennsylvania) that rely on retention elections to retain incumbents but which require a
partisan election when a vacancy occurs. 26 During the period in question there were 1,449
elections (seats) involving incumbents but only 414 open seat elections including three in which
the incumbent had sought reelection but were not renominated at party nominating
conventions. 27 Because of the much smaller number of elections, I have grouped elections into
four year intervals in the following figures; the year shown in the figure includes the two years
prior plus the one year after (e.g., 1948 covers elections from 1946 through 1949). Also, because
there are by definition no incumbent defeats in such elections, the bottom-most area represents
what I have labeled competitive elections (and is still shown in medium gray).
Figure 6 shows the pattern for all open-seat elections. There is a slight increase in the
likelihood of the winner receiving less than 60 percent of the vote (the bottom most area shown
26

In some states requiring such elections, the governor can appoint someone to fill the seat until the election. In a
number of cases, the governor appointed someone who pledged not to run in the election which insured an open seat
election. In others, the appointee ran for the seat, and I group those elections with elections involving an incumbent.
27
One of the open seat elections was a last minute vacancy which was conducted entirely as a write-in election; it is
omitted from the analysis. Two of the elections where incumbents lost at party conventions (both in Tennessee), the
party’s nominee was unopposed in the subsequent election; those two elections are also omitted from the analysis.
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FIGURE 6: CONTESTATION AND COMPETITIVENESS, ALL OPEN SEAT
ELECTIONS, 1946-2009

in the figure), with that increase coming from both uncontested elections and noncompetitive
elections. There may be a slight dip in the proportion of elections that were competitive during
the 1960s. However, comparing the early and late periods does not reveal any statistically
significant change (GOF • 2 =1.80, p=.406). As before, we need to look separately at nonpartisan
and partisan plus mixed elections.
Figure 7 shows separate patterns for the two broad types of elections. While the patterns
appear to differ, we need to treat those differences with caution because GOF chi square tests for
examining change over time for each of these two subsets generally fail to achieve statistical
significance. For nonpartisan elections, while the percentage of elections that are competitive is
greater than it was during the earliest years shown, the period of highest competitiveness appears
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FIGURE 7: CONTESTATION AND COMPETITIVENESS, OPEN SEAT
ELECTIONS CONTROLLING FOR ELECTION TYPE
(a) NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS

(b) PARTISAN AND MIXED ELECTIONS
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to be in the middle of the period (about 1970 to the mid, or perhaps early, 1980s). In contrast, in
partisan and mixed states, the most recent years show the highest levels of competition and there
is a period of lesser competition in the middle years (about 1960 to around 1980). 28 Exactly why
the patterns for the two broad types of elections may differ is not obvious, although some of what
is going on here could again reflect differences due to partisan elections in the South.
Figure 8 shows partisan and mixed elections separately for southern and nonsouthern states.
In both regions one sees an increase in competitiveness over time. For the nonsouthern states,
this increase occurred in the 1980s. In the South, similar to what occurred in elections with
incumbents, there was a decline in competitive elections in the 1960s and 1970s compared to the
level in the years examined before 1960, with an increase starting in the late 70s or early 80s. 29
For the Nonsouth, there is no statistically significant pattern of change. Importantly, every one of
the 153 open-seat partisan or mixed elections outside the South during the period was contested.
In contrast, 19 of the 142 partisan open seat elections in the South went uncontested in both
primary and general elections.
As I noted previously, I believe that the best explanation for what has transpired in the
South, and hence the bulk of the change that has occurred in the competitiveness of state
supreme court elections, reflects the shift of the southern states from essentially noncompetitive
one-party political systems to two-party systems. There is no clear way to “prove” that this is the
explanation, but the timing of the shifting patterns in the South seems more consistent with this
explanation than the alternatives, and it explains why the bulk of the change has occurred in
28

A GOF chi square test examining the proportion of partisan and mixed elections that are competitive (the winner
received less than 60 percent) versus noncompetitive or unopposed does achieve statistical significance (• 2=6.98,
p=.031). A Wald test based on a dichotomous logistic regression with clustering on state also achieves statistical
significance (• 2=9.21, p=.010).
29
Both GOF and Wald chi squares (from a dichotomous logistic regression with clustering on state) achieve
statistical significance (GOF • 2=8.33, p=.016; Wald • 2=6.87, p=.032).
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FIGURE 8: CONTESTATION AND COMPETITIVENESS, PARTISAN AND MIXED
OPEN SEAT ELECTIONS CONTROLLING FOR REGION
(a) SOUTH

(b) NONSOUTH
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southern states. Figure 9 provides a bit more evidence in support of this explanation. The figure
shows two trend lines for partisan elections in the southern states. The gray line (with black
markers) shows the percentage of elections that were competitive by my definition (the
incumbent lost or the winner obtained less than 60 percent). The black line (with gray markers)
shows the percentage of contested elections in which the contest was in the general election (i.e.,
there was a contested general election and it was closer than the primary election won by the
incumbent or eventual winner). The similarity of the two lines is quite strong, and the two series
correlate .75. I interpret this strong relationship as indicative that competitiveness in this set of
elections was strongly related to two-party competition.
Undoubtedly there was some increase in expenditures and campaign activity with the
emergence of the Republican Party in the South. However, I would argue that those increases
were in response to the increased competition rather than being a cause of increased competition.
The recent debate has been over whether the sharp increases in expenditures and advertising seen
during the last decade has changed the nature of competition in state supreme court elections. In
other words, I am arguing that the changes in the South started around 1980 and were internal to
the party system rather than reflecting the role of external players such as interest groups that
provide campaign funds and run advertisements. 30 As the Republican Party became more
successful in the South, various external actors increased their activities. Importantly, while such
actors also increased their involvement in both partisan and nonpartisan elections outside the

30

According to data assembled by the Brennan Center, state supreme court candidates collected about $6 million for
the 1989-90 biennium, and about $9.5 for the 1991-92 biennium. The next three biennia candidates raised about
$21-27 million. The presidential election biennia of 1999-2000, 2003-04, and 2007-08 saw amounts around $45
million with the two off-year biennia with amounts on the order of $30 million (Sample, Skaggs, Blitzer, and Casey
2010: 5). Thus, the rise in compeitiveness in the South predates the sharp increases in fundraising (and expenditures)
that began to take off in the mid-1990s.
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FIGURE 9: COMPETITIVENESS AND CONTESTED PARTISAN GENERAL
ELECTIONS IN SOUTHERN STATES

South, one does not see any evidence that their involvement has led to significant increases in the
amount of competition.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Overall it is accurate to say that state supreme court elections have become more highly
competitive, both in terms of more challenges to incumbents and in terms of a higher proportion
of elections falling in what I have defined as the competitive range (including incumbents being
defeated). However that broad pattern hides important variations, and the analysis shows that
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there are differences if one looks separately at nonpartisan states, partisan and mixed states
outside the South, and partisan states in the South.
The strongest pattern revealed by this analysis, other than the marked shift away from using
partisan elections, is that much of the change that has occurred has been concentrated in southern
states that hold partisan elections for their state supreme courts. In fact, for elections involving
incumbents, virtually all the change that has occurred has been in those states; whatever change
there has been in contestation and competitiveness in nonpartisan states and in nonsouthern
partisan states is minimal at best. For open seat elections there is a pattern of increased
competition in partisan and mixed elections in both the South and the Nonsouth, although the
specific pattern differs slightly; for nonpartisan states, there has actually been, if anything, a
decline in the competitiveness of open seat elections over the last 20 years or so.
Over the last decade, a variety of commentators have argued that judicial elections,
particularly those for seats on state supreme courts, have changed as a result of the inflow of
substantial sums of money for advertising, either by the candidates’ campaigns or as independent
expenditures. One can certainly point to specific elections where such advertising appears to
have made a difference. A good candidate here is the defeat in April 2008 of Justice Louis
Butler, the first African-American to serve on the Wisconsin Supreme Court (American
Judicature Society 2010, 224; Sample, Skaggs, Blitzer, and Casey 2010, 32-33). Justice Butler’s
opponent, state trial judge Michael Gableman. Gableman’s campaign ran an advertisement
described by the President of the State Bar of Wisconsin as “disgraceful, deliberately misleading
[which was] cast in an offensive, race-baiting style to negatively attack Justice Butler's role as a
former public defender [by] falsely suggest[ing] that a dangerous criminal was released as a
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result of Justice Butler's work…” (Basting 2008). 31 This was undoubtedly a nasty election; 53
percent of all of the airings of attack advertisements run during 2008 state supreme court
elections were aired in Wisconsin, and 59 percent of the airings of ads during that election were
attack ads. 32 However, the larger question is how have the changes to campaigning and
expenditures that have occurred affected the election process, and particularly to patterns in
election outcomes? 33
Overall, the analysis presented here does not support the proposition that patterns in
aggregate election results have changed markedly due to any changes over the last 15-20 years
in how state supreme court campaigns are conducted. The major change that one sees in looking
over the last 64 years reflects the shift of the South from one-party Democratic, to competitive,
and in some states to what in the most recent years has been clear Republican dominance. The
remaining changes regarding aggregate election results are relatively small. Thus, leaving aside
the broad changes that have occurred in the southern states, the picture that emerges from this
analysis is, perhaps surprisingly, one of relatively stability.

31

The state Judicial Commission brought charges against Justice Gableman for actions during his campaign, but
ultimately dropped those charges (in July 2010) after the six other members of the Wisconsin Supreme Court split 33 on whether his behavior was a violation and how to proceed further with the case. Previously a three-judge panel
had found that Gableman had recommended dismissing the case on the grounds that the advertisement had not
contained false information (see Patrick Marley, “With Supreme Court Deadlocked, Commission Drops Gableman
Ethics Case,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/98037184.html, posted July
8, 2010 [lasted visited July 30, 2010]).
32
These figures were compiled from information in the 2010 Brennan Center report (Sample, Skaggs, Blitzer, and
Casey 2010,86-97).
33
This is by no means the only question one can ask about increasing prevalence of high volume television
advertising in judicial election campaigns. Another issue, which I do not address, is on the public’s view of the
courts (see Gibson 2009).

-26-

-27-

1,862

Total

1,449

980

39
44
55
48
45
44
51
45
36
30
47
30
31
28
33
33
23
31
27
22
21
25
26
25
18
22
19
23
15
13
17
14
187

695

19
19
22
19
23
21
19
24
18
19
18
20
19
19
23
21
16
23
22
24
21
17
22
23
18
26
23
28
19
29
33
28
578

871

Figure 3 Figure 4
16
36
16
40
18
44
18
42
21
42
19
44
17
48
20
49
13
37
17
34
17
41
17
24
18
28
18
24
20
25
15
26
13
24
17
23
18
25
20
19
20
16
14
19
20
16
18
21
14
14
19
15
14
20
22
17
16
13
22
15
25
17
26
13

Figure 2
6
8
7
7
7
9
7
10
8
6
6
5
8
8
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
5
4
4
6
5
4
6
4
3

Figure 1
52
56
62
60
63
63
65
69
50
51
58
41
46
42
45
41
37
40
43
39
36
33
36
39
28
34
34
39
29
37
42
39

*Three incumbents lost at conventions; those seats are treated as open
**Includes mixed

64
71
84
74
75
74
77
79
62
55
71
55
58
55
62
59
44
59
54
51
47
46
52
53
40
52
48
56
38
48
54
45

1946
1948
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008

All

With Incumbents
NonPartisan
partisan or Mixed

Incumbent
By Type
Running
NonPartisan Mixed partisan
All
Nonsouth**

504

367

Figure 5a Figure 5b
16
20
19
21
22
22
19
23
20
22
18
26
24
24
20
29
20
17
19
15
25
16
16
8
18
10
13
11
15
10
19
7
16
8
17
6
21
4
12
7
13
3
15
4
10
6
16
5
11
3
9
6
13
7
10
7
9
4
8
7
14
3
7
6

South

Partisan with Incumbents

5
4
6
7
4
2
9
9
8
4
7
11
15
10
10

36
23
22
16
27
25
35
26
23
24
30
30
31
20
18

117

6

413

South

296

8

10

16

19

23

20

15

17

26

23

23

9

16

19

31

21

143

4

5

11

12

14

11

8

12

15

8

12

3

4

6

12

6

153

4

5

5

7

9

9

7

5

11

15

11

6

12

13

19

15

Figure 8b

Nonsouth**

Open Partisan

Figure 7a Figure 7b Figure 8a

Open Seat
NonPartisan or
partisan
Mixed

27

Figure 6

All

Open Seat

APPENDIX A: NUMBER OF EACH TYPE OF ELECTION BY YEAR

TABLE A1: NUMBERS OF ELECTIONS REPRESENTED IN FIGURES

APPENDIX B: TYPE OF ELECTION IN EACH STATE

FIGURE B1: CHANGES IN TYPE OF ELECTIONS FOR STATE SUPREME COURT
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